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Abstract 
The vast majority of world trade flows is between firms. Only recently has research in 
international trade started to emphasize the importance of the connections between exporters and 
importers both in aggregate trade flows and in the negative relationship between trade and 
geographic distance. This chapter documents the role of firm-to-firm connections in trade flows 
and the formation and duration of these importer-exporter relationships. Using customs data from 
Colombia for 1995-2014, we are able to identify both the Colombian importing firm and the 
foreign exporter in every Colombian import and export transaction. We document both the nature 
of these bilateral trading relationships and their evolution over time. 
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Firm-to-Firm Connections in Colombian Imports
1 Introduction
Aggregate trade flows are composed of transactions between individual buying (importers) and
selling (exporters) firms. The rise of the large literature on heterogeneous firms has recognized the
importance of variation across exporters, and to a lesser extent across importers, in determining
aggregate trade flows. However, even in that firm-focused research, the detailed trade transaction
data are usually aggregated to the level of individual firms, summed across all buyers for exporters,
or conversely, summed across all sellers for importers, before being used by researchers. Naturally,
both empirical and theoretical work on international trade has also focused on firms on either side
of the market, exporters in Melitz (2003) or importers in Antràs et al. (2014). In this paper, we
explore the individual matches between exporters and importers and examine the evolution of these
microeconomic relationships.
During the decades since the end of WWII, the world has seen both immense progress on the
reductions of tariffs and other barriers to international trade in goods as well as dramatic reductions
in transport and communication costs. The rise of containerization, the successful multilateral
rounds of the GATT and the WTO and the exponential increase in telecommunications capabilities
have combined to allow the fragmentation of production across borders and have driven increases in
the volume of global trade far faster than those for GDP (see Baldwin (2017)). However, in spite of
these advances, estimates of trade costs between distant locations remained largely unchanged (Head
and Mayer (2014)), suggesting that other forms of trade costs continue to be substantial impediments
to global integration. This chapter explores the role of firm-to-firm connections in international
trade both in the cross-section and over time as a first step towards a greater understanding of the
firm-level costs of trade.
We have access to a rich data set for Colombian firms where the identities of both the exporter
and the importer are known, and where each import transaction can be linked to a specific seller
in a source country, and each Colombian firm’s annual export transactions can be linked to specific
buyers in every destination country. This allows us to develop a set of basic facts about sellers and
buyers across markets at a point in time as well as the evolution of those buyer-seller relationships
over time. We contribute to this nascent literature by confirming and extending previous findings
on the importance of the extensive and intensive margins of trade.
The emergence of research examining firms on both sides of trade transactions has potentially
important implications for policy and academic work on the origins of international trade. While
substantial progress has been made on reducing tariffs on manufactured goods, especially for flows
between higher income nations, empirical evidence suggests that substantial costs remain. Estimates
of fixed and variable costs of trade are large, even as technology and policy have reduced costs of
transport, communication and tariffs. To engender another round of global integration with its
attendant increases in income, consumption and welfare, research must refocus attention on the
nature of the trade costs between the firms that engage in trade.
This paper contributes to that agenda by documenting the relationships between Colombian
firms and their foreign suppliers. We find evidence that the extensive margin of importer-exporter
connections is strongly correlated with aggregate country-level trade flows. In addition, there is
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substantial heterogeneity across both importers and exporters in terms of the numbers of partners
and the levels of trade flows. Again, the extensive margin is crucial in explaining the variation in
import levels across firms. Large importers do not import more from each partner but rather have
many more partners than smaller importers.
International trade involves firms trading with each other, rather than directly with final con-
sumers. Even domestic economies are comprised of a large network of buyers and sellers. The
continuing revolution in international trade transaction data is opening up the black box of firm-to-
firm connections across borders. One temptation is to think of this as just another extensive margin
of trade. However, firm behavior is important on both sides of any international trade relationship
and existing frameworks largely ignore the interaction between buyers and sellers each of whom
may have market power (Bernard and Dhingra (2015)). Evidence in this chapter and elsewhere
shows that the extensive margins of trade, including that of foreign partners, are important both in
the aggregate and within firms. In addition variation in the extensive margins is one of the forces
underlying the power of the gravity model in explaining aggregate trade volumes.
At a basic level we are still learning how firms structure their global supply and customer
networks and know little about a range of important questions: do firms have multiple suppliers of
the same product, how frequently do importers change their suppliers, do importers switch partners
to replace one supplier of a product with another, what determines successful trade partnerships
and what differences are there between the big, dominant global firms and the large number of
smaller firms engaged in trade. This chapter will provide evidence on these questions for Colombian
importers.
2 Literature
Before turning to the Colombian trade data, we briefly review the literature on firms and trade.
The role of heterogeneous firms in exporting has been the subject of a large literature, see surveys
by Tybout (2003), Bernard et al. (2007), Redding (2011), Melitz and Redding (2012), and Bernard
et al. (2012). However, it is important to note that in that large theoretical and empirical literature
the role of partner importing firms is largely left unmentioned. The exporting firm is heterogeneous
and “interesting” while the destination market is typically modeled as populated by a representative
consumer. Similarly in the smaller and more recent literature on importing and global sourcing,
the exporting firms are also largely “uninteresting”. Our focus is on the role of firms on both ends
of the trade transaction; we will first briefly review the emerging research on importing and then
survey the smaller body of work looking at importer-exporter pairings.
2.1 Firms and Importing
There has been substantial recent work examining the characteristics and choices of importing firms.
Work on the characteristics of importers for the US (Bernard et al. (2007) and Bernard et al. (2009)),
Belgium (Muuls and Pisu (2009)), and Italy (Castellani et al. (2010)) shows that importers share
many of the characteristics of exporting firms in terms of their larger size and higher productivity.
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In addition these papers find similar heterogeneity across importing firms with the largest importers
sourcing many products from many countries. In fact, large importers and large exporters tend to
be the same firms, (Bernard et al. (2007)), as well as the most likely to have foreign affiliates and
be embedded in global production networks (Bernard et al. (forthcomingb)). Our work extends this
research by examining the connections between importers and exporters and exploring the link to
firm size.
The causal nature of the relationship between importing and productivity has been examined
by a number of authors. Amiti and Konings (2007) find large productivity gains from reductions
in input tariffs on imported intermediate goods for Indonesian firms. Goldberg et al. (2010) also
examine trade liberalization and imported inputs. They find substantial gains from trade through
access to new imported inputs driven by increased firm access to new input varieties. Halpern et
al. (2015) attribute one-quarter of Hungarian productivity growth during 1993-2002 to increases in
imported inputs. Bøler et al. (2015) find that cheaper R&D stimulates imports of intermediates
and that improved access to imported inputs promotes technological change. Our work contributes
to this stream of research by examining the firm linkages underlying the import of intermediate
inputs.
A different approach to importing firms examines the decision to source from abroad. Feenstra
and Hanson (2005), Nunn and Trefler (2008), Bernard et al. (2010) consider contracting and con-
tractability in the decision to offshore inside or outside the firm. Antràs et al. (2014) study the
extensive and intensive margins of firms’ global sourcing decisions, while Fort (2017) examines the
interaction of technology and industry characteristics and shows substantial differences in the effects
on domestic versus foreign outsourcing.
2.2 Firm-to-firm Connections
One of the earliest authors to consider the role of networks and firm-to-firm connections in trade
is Rauch (1999) who introduces the idea that information frictions might dampen trade and that
the customer or supplier network might help reduce those frictions. Arkolakis (2010) provides
an early model of the costly acquisition of consumers and while he does not model firm-to-firm
connections, his framework is strongly linked to the emerging work on production and sales networks.
Rauch and Watson (2004), Antràs and Costinot (2011), Petropoulou (2011), Chaney (2014) model
intermediaries as agents that facilitate matching between sellers/exporters and foreign buyers.
Work on firm-to firm connections is not limited to international trade. Additional theoretical
and empirical contributions, often examining the role of production networks in the propagation of
shocks, include Oberfeld (2013), Acemoglu et al. (2012), Carvalho et al. (2014), Magerman et al.
(2016) and Bernard et al. (2017).
Recent work has started exploring the cross-section of trading relationships between exporters
and importers. Blum et al. (2010; 2012) examine characteristics of trade transactions for the
exporter-importer pairs of Chile-Colombia and Argentina-Chile while Eaton et al. (2014) consider
exports of Colombian firms to specific importing firms in the United States. Using Norwegian data,
Bernard et al. (forthcominga) find support for a model where exporters vary in their efficiency in
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producing differentiated intermediate goods and pay a relation-specific fixed cost to match with each
buyer. Eaton et al. (2014) develop a model of search and learning to explain the dynamic pattern
of entry and survival by Colombian exporters and to differentiate between the costs of finding new
buyers and to maintaining relationships with existing ones. Monarch (2013) estimates switching
costs using a panel of U.S importers and Chinese exporters and Dragusanu (2014) explores how the
matching process varies across the supply chain using U.S.-Indian data. Sugita et al. (2014) study
matching patterns in U.S.-Mexico trade while Benguria (2014) estimates a trade model with search
costs using matched French-Colombian data. Carballo et al. (2013) focus on the role of importer
heterogeneity across destinations, using data on exporters from Costa Rica, Ecuador and Uruguay.
Some stylized facts are emerging from this literature. The buyer margin accounts for a large
fraction of the variation in aggregate trade, and is, in fact, as large or larger than the firm or product
margins in accounting for cross-country trade flows. Bernard et al. (forthcominga) show this using
Norwegian data. They also find that a firm’s number of customers is significantly higher in larger
markets and smaller in remote markets, i.e. importers per exporter vary systematically with GDP
and distance. This response of the buyer margin to gravity variables is also shown by Carballo et
al. (2013).
The population of sellers and buyers are extremely concentrated. Bernard et al. (forthcominga)
find that the top 10 percent of exporters to an OECD country typically account for more than 90
percent of aggregate exports to that destination. At the same time, the top 10 percent of buyers
from an OECD country are as dominant and also account for more than 90 percent of aggregate
purchases. This concentration of imports and exports in a small set of firms is similar to that found
by Bernard et al. (2009) and Bernard et al. (forthcomingb) for the US and Mayer and Ottaviano
(2008) for other European countries. Although a handful of exporters and importers account for
a large share of aggregate trade, these large firms are matching with many partners; one-to-one
matches are typically not important in the aggregate. Many-to-many matches, i.e. where both
exporter and importer have multiple connections, make up almost two thirds of aggregate trade.
Using trade data for Chile and Colombia as well as Argentine and Chile, Blum et al. (2012) similarly
point to the dominance of large exporter - large importer matches among the total number of trading
pairs.
The distributions of buyers per exporter and exporters per buyer are characterized by many
firms with few connections and a few firms with many connections. Bernard et al. (forthcominga)
plot the number of exporters per buyer in a particular market against the fraction of buyers in
this market who buy from at least that many exporters. The distributions appear to be largely
consistent with a Pareto distribution as the cdfs are close to linear except in the tails, consistent
with the findings by Blum et al. (2010; 2012) and Carballo et al. (2013). Within a market, exporters
with more customers have higher total sales, but the distribution of exports across customers does
not vary systematically with the number of customers. Firms with more buyers typically export
more: in the Norwegian data, the average firm with 10 customers in a destination exports more
than 10 times as much as a firm with only one customer.
In looking at the nature of the connections between firms, there is negative degree assortativity
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among sellers and buyers: the better connected a seller, the less well-connected is its average buyer.
In recent work by Bernard et al. (2014), negative degree assortativity is found for buyer-seller links
among Japanese firms. Their Japanese dataset covers close to the universe of domestic buyer-seller
links and therefore contains information about the full set of buyer linkages (not only the linkages
going back to the source market). Negative degree assortativity does not mean that well-connected
exporters only sell to less-connected buyers; instead it suggests that well-connected exporters typi-
cally sell to both well-connected buyers and less-connected buyers, whereas less-connected exporters
typically only sell to well-connected buyers. Degree assortativity is only a meaningful measure in
economic environments with many-to-many matching. Moreover, negative degree assortativity can
coexist with positive assortative matching on the intensive (export value) margin. Using the Colom-
bian import data, we corroborate these main stylized facts and examine the nature of the evolution
of trading partnerships over time.
3 Data
Our primary data source is the customs records of Colombia and includes a complete history of
Colombian import and export transactions from 1995-2014. This period includes dramatic changes
in the Colombian economy, periods of external liberalization and domestic reforms as well as several
economic crises.
The data include all the available information on the customs forms. We focus on a subset
of the data. On the import side this includes the name of foreign firm i in country s selling
quantity q of product p to Colombian firm j for x USD on date d. Products are defined at the
HS 10-digit level using the Colombian classification matching the tariff line for Colombian imports.
Colombian importers are identified by their national identification number, NIT, while foreign firms
have alphanumeric names in the data. The foreign firm name data are very noisy. Using the
information on the customs forms with no cleaning results in 1,847,822 foreign firms. We clean the
foreign firms’ names first by dropping or correcting typical prefixes and suffixes (e.g. “inc”, “co.”,
“spa” etc), dropping non alpha numeric characters and then employing machine learning algorithms
to group likely common spelling variants or misspellings. We vary the parameters on the machine
learning algorithms to create sets of firms’ names that are likely overmatched and under-matched.
Throughout this paper we use the overmatched set to avoid overemphasizing the extensive firm-to-
firm margin.1 After cleaning we are left with 432,156 unique foreign firms across the 20 years.
There are 3,023,055 million import transactions across 146,896 importer-exporter pairs in 2014.
27,927 Colombian firms imported while there were 82,762 foreign suppliers (see column 1 of table
2).2
1While there is also information on foreign addresses and telephone numbers, it is missing in many cases and
subject to even more variation so we to date have not employed this in grouping transactions.
2We retain all Colombian importers in our analysis including manufacturing and service firms. The latter group
includes retailers, wholesalers and other service firms.
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3.1 Colombian Trade Over Time
From 1995 to 2014, Colombia experienced a boom in international trade, both exports and
imports. As shown in Figure 1, total imports into Colombia expressed in terms of US$ increased
more than 450 percent during the period. The data show clearly the effects of several crises in
the Colombian and world economies. In 1999, following large devaluations and crises in Brazil
and Russia, Colombia experienced its first recession in 60 years and was also forced to allow its
exchange rate to float, resulting in a 30 percent devaluation against the dollar. The reduction in
imports from both the economic crisis and devaluation is apparent in the 27.5 percent reduction in
imports. The number of Colombian importers and foreign exporters fell far less during the same
period, 10.7 and 8.6 percent respectively. Import declines occurred again in 2001–2002 (0.9 percent)
and 2008-2009 (16.2 percent) as a result of external economic shocks in Colombia’s primary trading
partners. Again the adjustments of the extensive margins of the number of trading firms was much
lower, suggestive of the costs needed to create the relationships in the first place.
In Figure 2, we show the evolution of the mean number of exporters, products, and source
countries per importer. The average number of foreign partners and source countries have been
stable over time while the number of imported products rose steadily until the onset of the Great
Recession and has been stable since.
4 Cross Section
In this section, we examine the nature of firm-to-firm connections at a point in time. Whereas the
emerging literature has documented facts from data on exports as described above, we document
the firm-firm connections from the Colombian importing perspective.
4.1 Margins of Trade
We start by decomposing aggregate country-level trade flows into their constituents parts, i.e the
roles of exporting firms, importing firms, products and average value per exporter-importer-product
per year. This already represents an aggregation from the raw transaction level data which includes
the additional dimensions of the number of transactions per exporter-importer-product during the
year. With this decomposition, total imports from country j into Colombia in any given year can
be represented as
mj = sjpjbjdj x¯j .
with sj , the number of sellers (exporters) in country j, pj , the total number of products shipped
by all sellers in country j, bj , the number of Colombian firms that import from country j, x¯j ,
average value per buyer-seller-product, and dj (or density), the fraction of actual sbp triples out of
all possible exporter-importer-product combinations.
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We regress each of the margins on total imports (in logs) using data from 2014 to assess the
contribution of each of the three extensive margins (buyers, sellers, products) and the intensive
margin (average imports per buyer-seller-product) in this decomposition. This set of regressions
gives us a relatively simple way to examine the role of different microeconomic components of trade
to aggregate trade flows. While previous research has examined the role of the number of exporters
and the number of exported products, we are able to examine both the buyer and seller contribution
to the variation of Colombian imports across source countries.3
Given that OLS is a linear estimator and its residuals have an expected value of zero, the
coefficients for each set of regressions sum to unity, with each coefficient representing the share of
overall variation in trade explained by the respective margin.4
The results in Table 1 confirm earlier work on extensive margin contributions to the cross-
country variation in aggregate trade volumes. Both the number of importers and the number of
products increase rapidly as total trade volumes rise. However, here we see that the role of the
number of foreign partners, in this case exporters, is equally large. Large trade volumes between
pairs of countries are associated with large numbers of firms on both sides of the border as well
as large numbers of products. The intensive margin also covaries positively with total trade across
countries but accounts for just under 40 percent of the total variance.5 Bigger trade volumes are
associated with higher shipments per importer-exporter-product and particularly with increases in
the extensive margins of more importers, more exporters and more products.
4.2 Connections
In 2014, there are 146,896 trading relationships involving 27,927 Colombian importing firms and
82,762 foreign exporters. As shown in Table 2, the distribution of the value in these partnerships is
highly skewed with the mean more than 15 times larger than the median. Similarly, the distributions
of exporters per importer and importers per exporter reflect the presence of large trading firms. The
mean importer has 5.26 foreign partners while the median has two. These distributions confirm that
the findings of prior research on the importance of large firms in international trade flows also hold in
Colombia, see Bernard et al. (2009), Mayer and Ottaviano (2008), and Bernard et al. (forthcomingb).
Looking at individual source countries, the US is by far the largest source for imports into
Colombia, accounting for roughly one third of the trading partnerships and import value. Among
Colombian importers, 49 percent bought from at least one US partner. The relative lower cost of
3It is possible to examine the margins one at a time using the results from this analysis. For example, a decom-
position into the number of importers and average imports per importer would correspond to column (1), importers,
and the sum of columns (2)-(5), average importers per importer, in Table 1.
4The coefficient on the density term is expected to be negative as the fraction of active importer-exporter-product
triples from a country is decreasing as the total possible number of triples increases.
5To see this consider the decomposition into the number of active importer-exporter-products which corresponds
to the sum of columns (1)-(4) and the average shipments per importer-exporter-product, column (5).
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trading with the US is also reflected in the lower value imports for the median partnership, i.e.
relatively smaller transactions with the US are profitable. Across all the major source countries,
the median Colombian importer has just one partner.
Figure 3 plots the distributions of exporters per Colombian importer and importers per foreign
exporter across all relationships. The sub-figures are double log distributions with discrete steps, for
example the upper panel has the number of suppliers per importer against the cumulative fraction
of Colombian firms with at least x foreign suppliers. In both cases, the distribution is very close
to a power law except in the extreme tails. There is a small number of firms, either Colombian
importers or foreign exporters, with many partners and a large number of firms with a small number
of partners.
The log linearity of the distributions appears at the country level as well for importers per
exporter. This captures the stylized fact that a few firms, either exporters or importers, have large
numbers of connections while large numbers of firms have just one or two foreign partners. For all
five of the top source countries the distribution is indistinguishable from log-linearity.6
4.3 Matching
The preceding results suggest that most Colombian importing firms have few partners while
only a few are connected to many foreign exporters. However, we can group trading relationships
and trade value by types of firms according to their number of partners. In Table 3 we place firms
in two groups, one where the firm has only a single foreign partner and the other where the firm
has multiple foreign partners.7
Table 3 confirms the important role for large, well-connected firms in international trade flows.
Firms with more than one foreign partner appear in the vast majority, 88 percent of partnerships
in 2014. Those partnerships in turn account for the preponderance of Colombian import value, 91
percent. In fact, more than half of Colombian imports by value are conducted between exporting
and importing firms that each have multiple partners, i.e. there are large, well-connected firms on
both sides of the transaction. These results are perhaps unsurprising given previous research that
has emphasized the role of large, global firms in international trade.
6Bernard et al. (forthcominga) develop a model with Pareto distributed productivity for importers and exporters
that results in the log-log linear relationships shown in Figures 3 and 4.
7For the foreign firms we can only see their Colombian exports, so the two groups are foreign exporting firms with
one Colombian import partner and foreign firms with multiple Colombian importers.
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The link between the number of foreign partners and total firm imports can be seen clearly in
Figure 5. The vertical axis shows log imports, normalized such that log imports are relative to
the average imports for one-supplier firms. On the horizontal axis is the number of suppliers. Log
firm imports are strongly positively and linearly related to the number of foreign partners of the
Colombian importer. Big importers import from many firms.
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However, while large importers import from many exporters, they do not import more from each
partner. Figure 6 shows the log value of imports for suppliers at the 80th, 50th and 20th percentiles
of the supplier distribution for importers with 5 or more suppliers.8 The vertical axis is log imports
in the partnership, normalized by source to be 1 for importers with a single foreign partner. The
horizontal axis is the log number of foreign suppliers for the Colombian importer.
Sales from the median foreign supplier to the Colombian importer (the middle line) are invariant
across firms, regardless of the number of foreign partners shipping to the Colombian firm. In
addition, the value of shipments from the median exporter are the same as average purchases by
Colombian firms with a single foreign partner. The same invariance holds for larger partners (80th
percentile) and smaller partners (20th percentile). Large importers have more foreign suppliers but
they do not purchase more from each of those suppliers.
This result is confirmed by work on Norwegian exports (Bernard et al. (forthcominga)) and on
the domestic firm-to-firm production network in Belgium (Bernard et al. (2017)) and is of substantial
significance for future research on firm size and aggregate export flows. Export volumes are large
because of large numbers of partnerships, especially with a large firm on one or both sides of the
relationship, and because large firms have many partners.
4.4 Assortativity
The literature on firm-to-firm connections in trade has many points of contact with the larger
existing literatures on social and economic networks. One striking difference is in the assortativity
of connections and the relationships between well-connected and poorly connected firms. Social
networks display a common strong tendency for the best connected people (nodes) to be more
likely to be connected to other well-connected people (nodes). This feature means that the average
connectedness of one’s connections increases in your own number of connections, i.e. popular people
are connected to other popular people.
Firm-to-firm connections systematically display negative assortativity. Figure 7 shows the num-
ber of suppliers per Colombian firm from a given source country j, aj , on the x axis and the average
number of Colombian connections among those suppliers, sj(aj), on the y axis. The axes scales are
in logs and both variables are demeaned at the source country level.
8For a Colombian firm with 10 suppliers this represents the imports from foreign exporters with the 2nd 5th, and
8th largest sales to the Colombian importer.
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While there is a large amount of dispersion, as in many other studies of international trade and
domestic connections, we find a significant negative relationship. Colombian firms that have large
numbers of suppliers in a source country (to the right along the x axis) on average are connected with
suppliers that have fewer Colombian partners. This finding suggests again that there is typically
a large firm on one side of most Colombian import relationships. It does not mean that well-
connected Colombian firms only connect with small (less well-connected) foreign firms. Rather,
well-connected Colombian firms connect with large, medium and small foreign partners while small
(less well-connected) Colombian firms are more likely to only match with a well-connected partner.
Bernard et al. (forthcominga) document this finding in Norwegian export data and propose a model
with match-specific fixed costs. In that framework small firms cannot profitably match with other
small firms, while large firms can. In general this finding means that models designed to explain
importer-exporter pairings cannot mirror the framework in the social network literature that often
features preferential matching yielding positive assortativity.
4.5 Gravity and Connections
The importance of distance and market size (gravity) in explaining international trade flows is
the subject of a vast literature (see Head and Mayer (2014)). However, only recently have these
forces been linked to the extensive margins of trade. In Table 4 we estimate a simple gravity
regression for each of the margins discussed earlier including log distance and log GDP of the source
country. As expected, distance and GDP are negatively and positively correlated with the margins
respectively. The distance coefficient has similar magnitude for each of the extensive and intensive
margins although it is not statistically significant in any single regression. The aggregate coefficient
on distance is 0.74.9 GDP is positive and significant for each margin and the magnitude of the
relationship is stronger for the various extensive margins.
In Table 5 we look at the importance of distance and market size for import volume variation
within importing firms. The Table reports regressions for the number of foreign partners, the average
value per partner and total firm imports on source country log distance and log GDP. Distance is
negatively related to the number of foreign partners in a source and the average value of purchases
from the country with the magnitudes of the effects roughly equal. GDP, however, is much more
strongly linked to the number of connections with the effect on the extensive margin almost five
times larger than the effect on the average value of importer per partner. These results using the
gravity framework in the aggregate and within firms point to the importance of understanding the
barriers to making foreign connections.
9Running the same regression on aggregate imports at the country level yields a significant coefficient.
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5 Connections over time
The existing work on firm-to-firm connections has emphasized the differences across trading firms
in terms of the number and value of their partnerships. We now explore the evolution of these
importer-exporter connections over time.
5.1 Margins of Trade Over Time
We start by examining the importance of the different margins, both extensive and intensive,
in the growth of country-level shipments to Colombia. Similar to the decomposition for import
levels done earlier, we regress the log differences of the margin of imports on the log difference in
aggregate imports from each source country in Table 6. As before the coefficients sum to unity
and the regressions allow us to assess the contribution of each margin to the variance in annual
(and long-run) country growth rates. Panel A is an annual regression with no fixed effects; panel B
includes country fixed effects in the annual growth rate regression, and Panel C runs a cross-section
of long (19 year) differences.
The results are quite similar across the three specifications and are quite different from the cross-
section decomposition of import levels reported above. The three extensive margins each contribute
between 9 and 16 percent to aggregate growth rate variation. Accordingly, the intensive margin
is much more important in the growth rate decomposition than in the levels specifications. The
variation in the growth of imports across source countries is strongly correlated with the variation
in the growth in average imports per exporter-importer-product.
5.2 Adding and Dropping Suppliers
While the recent round of research on firm-to-firm relationships in trade has documented a set
of stylized facts that are robust across countries and years, there is less research on the evolution
of importer-exporter connections over time. Table 7 divides importing firms into three mutually
exclusively groups: those that increase the number of their suppliers, those that reduce the number,
those that leave the number of their suppliers unchanged at annual and five-year horizons.10 Less
than a third of importers leave the number of suppliers unchanged from one year to the next, while
over five year intervals more than 95 percent of firms adjust the count of suppliers up or down. Over
short and longer intervals, most Colombian importing firms are changing their supplier mix.
Table 8 provides a different perspective on the changing buyer-supplier connections by reporting
the fractions of Colombian importers that only add suppliers, only drop, both add and drop or leave
their supplier mix unchanged. From year to year, only 13 percent of importing firms maintain all
their existing connections without adding or dropping. More than three quarters of firms add at
least one supplier or drop at least one supplier while two thirds of firms both add and drop on an
10In each case the actual suppliers may have changed.
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annual basis. Over five-year intervals almost every firm is changing their supplier mix with more
than 90 percent of firms both adding and dropping.
Supplier churning is widespread among importing firms over short and especially longer horizons.
Table 9 examines the importance of new and dropped partners in the overall number of connections
and the share of import value for the firm. The four columns of the top panel report (i) the fraction
of the value of firm imports accounted for by new foreign partners, (ii) the fraction of connections
accounted by new foreign partners, (iii) the fraction of import value at continuing partnerships,
and (iv) the fraction of connections at continuing partnerships. The rows give the fractions for one
year and five year intervals.11 While the majority of suppliers are new to the importer each year
(52 percent) those relationships are smaller on average accounting for 20 percent of import value.
Relationships begun before the previous year are, on average, more than four times larger than
partnerships begun in the past year. Looking at five year intervals, we see a similar pattern. The
vast majority of connections are formed in a typical five-year interval but the older relationships
are much larger.
The bottom panel considers a similar breakdown, reporting the fraction of this year’s imports
and connections that are accounted for by partnerships that will stop and those that will continue.
Again more than half of today’s suppliers will no longer be matched to the importer next year.
Over a five year horizon, three quarters of the connections will disappear. The relationships that
will continue one year into the future represent more than 80 percent of today’s import value, and
those that will continue for five years represent half of today’s import value.
These findings suggest that the typical importing firm is engaged in a substantial amount of
churning of their supplier mix. Firms frequently add and drop partners which is at least suggestive
of relatively low costs of matching. More research is needed to examine how this churning varies
across importer and exporter industries.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of match length and match value for all importer-exporter pairs
across all twenty years in the data. As reported by Eaton et al. (2008), more than half of all
matches last only one year and are quite small in value. Aside from the big drop between matches
of length one and two years, the distribution of match length suggests a relatively stable attrition
rate of about 20 percent annually. Match numbers fall off much more quickly than value, confirming
that long-lived relationships are relatively more important in total import value and providing some
additional evidence on the role of the intensive margin.
11The five year intervals throughout the table represent averages for 1995-2000, 2002-2007, and 2009-2014.
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5.3 The 1997 Cohort of New Connections
In this and the next subsection, we focus on a single cohort of relationships starting in 1997.12 First,
we look at all new importer-exporter pairs in 1997 at new and continuing importers and then we
consider only firms that were new to importing in the same year.
64,432 importer-exporter connections were begun in 1997 across all importers. This includes
connections at new importers as well as new connections at firms that had previously imported
from other partners. Of those new cross-border relationships 6,360 (2,916) were still active five
(ten) years later.13 Considering all the importer-exporter connections that started in 1997, we
find that they account for almost 30 percent of total import value and more than 60 percent of
all importer-exporter connections in that first year. Over time the share of this cohort of new
connections in total importer-exporter relationships falls both because specific matches end and
because total Colombian imports, and thus the total number of connections, are growing. As we
found earlier, the share of value falls less quickly than the share of connections and by their second
year the surviving connections from the 1997 cohort are larger than average (value share is greater
than the connection share).
Table 11 gives a similar path for that cohort of new partnerships in 1997 from the perspective of
the importing firm. On average the new connections account for 74 percent of connections and 58
percent of import value for the importing firms that had at least one new connection. For those firms
that continue to import a decade later, that set of initial connections still accounts for more than
a third of the firm imports although it represents just 13 percent of their foreign supply relationships.
Figure 9 reports the exit rate for these new matches for the subsequent 17 years. As we saw
earlier, match disintegration rates are highest in the early years of a match. For new importers
the disintegration rate is higher, 61.3 percent, than for new connections at all importing firms, 51.3
percent, i.e. the age of the importer predicts the success of the match. Disintegration rates are high
and declining for the first several years of the match and then stabilize between 10-15 percent per
year.
5.4 The 1997 Cohort of New Importers
12Choosing 1997 gives us the longest continuous set of new importing relationships.
13New connections in 1997 are defined as an import transaction in an importer-exporter pair in 1997 that did not
transact in either 1995 or 1996.
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6854 Colombian firms s tarted importing i n 1997 o f whom 929 ( 550) were s till active five (ten) 
years later and 309 survived as importers to 2014.14 Importer failure rates also start quite high, two 
thirds of this entering cohort imported only once and an additional 17 percent imported for only 
2-3 years. After stabilizing the annual exit rate for Colombian importers is 7 percent.
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Except for the start year, three quarters of continuing importers start a new connection each
year. Those new connections cover more than 1400 products from more than 65 countries. First year
connections for continuing importers in this cohort average 1.22 suppliers per product. Total value
of imports increases at an average rate of 9 percent per year, while value per importer increases at
34 percent per year as smaller importers exit and continuing importers increase their transactions.
For 1997 starting importers that continue for at least 10 years, 20 percent have relationships that
lasted the full period.
5.5 Match Failure
In this section we look at factors that are correlated with the probability of failure of matches
between importers and exporters. A match is defined between two firms and can potentially include
multiple products. We consider characteristics of the importer and those of the exporter as well
as match-specific variables. As before we are limited in the extent of firm characteristics to those
available in the Colombian import data.
For Colombian importers we know the number of years the firm has been an importer since 1995
and the number of foreign partners from the particular source country. For the foreign exporter we
know how long it has exported to Colombia, and the number of Colombian import partners. For
the match itself, we include the current length of the match between the exporter and importer, the
value in the current year and whether or not it is a multi-product relationship. Finally we consider
the role of traditional gravity variables for the source country including GDP per capita, population
and distance.
Table 12 reports results of linear probability models for the failure of the match in year t+1;
the columns respectively include year fixed effects, importer and year fixed effects, importer-year
fixed effects and match and year fixed effects. In column 1, including only year fixed effects, we
find that the probability of match failure is lower the longer the Colombian firm has been importing
and the greater the number of foreign partners in the source country. Similarly match failure is
reduced if the foreign firm has been exporting for a longer time to Colombia and if it is connected
to more Colombian importers. Unconditionally, and perhaps unsurprisingly, “better” firms, those
that survive longer and have more partners, have lower rates of match failure. The “quality” of the
match is also negatively correlated with match failure. The length of the match, the value of the
match and multi-product matches all are associated with lower failure probabilities.
Gravity variables enter with perhaps unexpected coefficients. Unconditionally one would expect
matches to be harder to sustain at greater distances or in smaller markets. However, we find that
14New importers in 1997 are those who imported in 1997 but had not imported in either 1995 or 1996.
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conditional on the value and characteristics of the partners, distance is negatively associated with
match failure. While the number of connections and the value of connections is negatively related
to distance, as shown earlier, the survival of individual matches increases with distance. This is
suggestive of the possibility that the sunk costs of a match increase with distance and thus firms
are less willing to break a match at longer distances. Market size, however, works in the opposite
direction. Match failure rates are higher for markets with larger populations and higher GDP per
capita.
Including importer, or importer-year, fixed effects does not substantially alter the findings of
the match failure regressions. All the variables that potentially proxy for match quality are again
negatively related to match failure. Years of importing for the Colombian firm are negatively cor-
related with match failure although the number of exporters in the source country now is positive
and significant. Exporter age is positive but insignificant. The gravity-related source country vari-
ables are again negative for distance and positive for GDP per capita and population. Conditioning
on match fixed effects, the results are largely unchanged, although we now find match length is
positively related to failure.
6 Products
In this section we examine the relationship between importing firms and products. Table 13
reports summary statistics on products for all source countries, and for the top five sources of
Colombian imports. As with other trade-related variables the number of products per importer
is highly skewed. The mean number of products is 14.7 while the median is 4. A few firms are
importing large numbers of products but most importers import multiple products. This contrasts
with the evidence on the numbers of foreign partners and sourcing countries in Table 2 which showed
that most importers sourced from a single partner in a single country. This supports evidence from
numerous studies that document the prevalence of multi-product exporters in cross-border trade
flows. On the other side of the transactions, the mean number of products exported by a foreign
firm to Colombia is 6.3 and the median is 2 with relatively little variation across source countries.
Within an importer-exporter pair, the mean number of products is 4.4 and the median is 1, again
with modest variation across countries.
In their work modeling and documenting foreign sourcing by US manufacturing firms, Antràs
et al. (2014) report that the vast majority of firms source products from a single country. Looking
at Colombian imports, we see that 38 percent of importer-product combinations have more than
one supplier. However, only 9 percent of importer-product combinations source from multiple
countries. When firms have multiple suppliers, three quarters of the time those suppliers are in the
same source country. This provides some confirmatory evidence that there are substantial country-
specific sourcing costs along with the sunk costs within an exporter-importer relationship suggested
by the results in the previous section.
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Looking at changes in sourcing partners over time, in Table 14, we calculate the fraction of
product drops for single supplier relationships in year t that are replaced by a new supplier in year
t+1. This excludes all importer-products with multiple suppliers in year t. Surprisingly very few
product drops appear to be associated with churning of suppliers, on average fewer than 4 percent
of dropped products are imported in the following year from a different foreign firm. The second
column shows that within the set of replaced suppliers, most changes remain within the same source
country. More than two thirds of the new suppliers are from the same source country.
Over time, importers deepen their relationship with their suppliers. Within an importer over
time, the number of products per supplier rises three percent per year, see Table 15. We can see the
growing importance of long-time suppliers in Table 16 which follows the product characteristics of
matches started in 1997. As with other characteristics of the partnership such as import value, the
distribution of the number of products supplied by foreign partners is highly skewed. In the first
year of the match the mean products per supplier is close to 11 while the median is just 3. Over
time the number of products traded within a match rises dramatically; the annual increase for the
average surviving match is 20 percent per year (24 percent excluding the recession years), while
the increase at the median surviving firm is 23 percent per year (25 percent excluding the recession
years). The average partnership from this cohort involves more than 40 products after five years
and more than 80 products after a decade.
While surviving importers increase the number of suppliers, the last two columns of Table
16 show that the long-lived partnerships take on increasing significance for importers over time.
Products from importer-exporter connections that started in 1997 and survived for five years account
for 35-41 percent of all imported products. After 10 years, these relationships supply 41-48 percent
of the foreign products bought by the Colombian firm.
7 Conclusions
This chapter has explored a new comprehensive datasest of detailed firm-to firm Colombian import
transactions covering the period 1995-2014. The results shows that the extensive margin of foreign
partner firms plays an important role in both aggregate and especially firm-level trade flows. Large
importers are bigger precisely because they have many foreign partners and not because they trade
more with each partner. Gravity relationships that do well in explaining aggregate trade flows are
successful in part because they capture extensive margins effects.
Looking at importers and import partnerships over time, the findings are striking that most firms
see substantial changing in their supplier mix over both annual and, especially, longer time horizons.
Most importer-exporter pairs end within the first year or two, but those that survive grow rapidly.
Also firms do not appear to be dropping foreign suppliers to replace them with new providers of
16
the same product. The vast majority of changes are towards partners supplying different products
than those dropped.
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The results presented here suggest a path forward for future research. The ability of firms to
create profitable and productive matches across borders is a key ingredient in aggregate trade flows
and their growth. Large firms have more matches and thus larger trade volumes. However, the
underlying sources of the frictions that prevent these matches, or cause them to be short-lived, are
still unknown. Continued work using detailed firm-level trade transaction data with information
on both the importer and exporter is needed to develop a deeper understanding of the barriers to
trade in order to reduce them.
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Table 1: Country-level regressions (2014)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Buyers Sellers Products Intensive Density
Imports (log) 0.49a 0.48a 0.51a 0.39a -0.87a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Constant -4.20a -4.08a -3.75a 4.85a 7.18a
(0.31) (0.33) (0.30) (0.37) (0.55)
N 174 174 174 174 174
R2 0.78 0.74 0.80 0.60 0.77
Source: Authors calculations. a indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 2: Summary stats 2014 – All & Top 5 sources
VARIABLES All US China Mexico Germany Brazil
Total value in USD (millions) 55,199 19,229 3,728 3,254 1,820 1,691
# Colombian importers 27,927 13,680 9,278 2,851 2,831 2,829
# foreign exporters 82,762 24,557 16,076 2,431 3,501 2,641
Mean value per importer-exporter ($’000s) 375.77 405.71 138.93 687.27 295.76 308.71
Median value per importer-exporter ($’000s) 24.68 17.06 26.60 41.23 22.76 31.76
Mean exporters per importer 5.26 3.46 2.89 1.66 2.17 1.94
Median exporters per importer 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean importers per exporter 1.78 1.93 1.67 1.95 1.76 2.07
Median importers per exporter 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Log max/median import value 11.39 8.29 8.55 8.64 7.84
Source: Authors calculations
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Table 3: Match types
1995 2004 2014
Importer-Exporter Count Value Count Value Count Value
1-1 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.09
1-many 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.16
many-1 0.29 0.18 0.29 0.24 0.28 0.21
many-many 0.45 0.66 0.43 0.54 0.42 0.54
Source: Authors calculations
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Table 4: Gravity and Margins - Colombian Imports (2014)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (35)
Importers Exporters Products Intensive Density
Distance -0.37 -0.31 -0.38 -0.30 0.62
GDP 0.96a 0.91a 0.99a 0.67a -1.7a
N 60,671 60,671 60,671 60,671 60,671
R2 0.28 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.28
Source: Authors calculations. a indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 5: Within-firm gravity regression, 2014
(1) (2) (3)
Foreign Average
Sellers Imports Imports
Distance (log) -0.16a -0.14a -0.29a
GDP (log) 0.19a 0.04a 0.23a
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes
N 65,866 65,746 65,746
R2 0.47 0.55 0.54
Source: Authors calculations. a indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 6: Import Growth Decompositions -Country level regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ∆Buyers ∆Sellers ∆Products ∆Intensive ∆Density
(A) annual ∆ log imports (w/o country fe)
∆Imports (log) 0.13a 0.12a 0.16a 0.82a -0.23a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.03a 0.03a 0.04a -0.05a -0.05a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 2812 2812 2812 2812 2812
R2 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.80 0.17
(B) annual ∆ log imports (w country fe)
∆Imports (log) 0.13a 0.12a 0.16a 0.83a -0.23a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.03a 0.03a 0.04a -0.05a -0.05a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,812 2,812 2,812 2,812 2,812
R2 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.80 0.17
(C) long difference ∆ log imports
∆19Buyers ∆19Sellers ∆19Products ∆19Intensive ∆19Density
∆19Imports (log) 0.14a 0.15a 0.09c 0.88a -0.25a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Constant -867.24 416.03 -2271.04 2147.14 575.10
(2921.60) (2849.81) (4467.46) (4299.15) (5250.49)
N 93 93 93 93 93
R2 0.18 0.21 0.04 0.80 0.18
Source: Authors calculations. a indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 7: Fraction of surviving firms that increase suppliers, reduce suppliers, unchanged
Year Increase Reduce Unchanged
Annual 0.36 0.35 0.29
5-year 0.47 0.50 0.03
Source: Authors calculations
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Table 8: Fraction that add at least one new supplier, drop at least one old supplier, do both, do
neither
Year Add Drop Both Neither
Annual 0.77 0.76 0.66 0.13
5-year 0.94 0.97 0.92 0.01
Note: The annual numbers are the averages calculated across all pairs of years
from 1995-1996 through 2013-2014 inclusive. The 5-year numbers are the aver-
ages calculated across 1995-2000, 2002-2007, and 2009-2014. Source: Authors
calculations
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Table 9: Supplier and import value shares at new, dropped, and continuing suppliers
New Continuing
Year Value Connections Value Connections
Annual 0.20 0.52 0.80 0.48
5-year 0.57 0.86 0.43 0.14
Dropped Continuing
Year Value Connections Value Connections
Annual 0.17 0.52 0.83 0.49
5-year 0.46 0.75 0.54 0.25
Note: The annual numbers are the averages calculated across all pairs of years
from 1995-1996 through 2013-2014 inclusive. The 5-year numbers are the aver-
ages calculated across 1995-2000, 20002-2007, and 2009-2014. Source: Authors
calculations
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Table 10: New importer-exporter connections in 1997
Years Connections Value
1 0.63 0.29
2 0.17 0.19
3 0.10 0.12
4 0.06 0.09
5 0.04 0.08
6 0.03 0.06
7 0.02 0.05
8 0.02 0.04
9 0.01 0.03
10 0.01 0.03
11 0.01 0.03
12 0.01 0.03
13 0.01 0.02
14 0.00 0.02
15 0.00 0.02
16 0.00 0.02
17 0.00 0.02
18 0.00 0.02
Source: Authors calculations
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Table 11: New importer-exporter connections in 1997 - importing firm
Years Connections Value
1 0.74 0.58
2 0.34 0.43
3 0.26 0.37
4 0.20 0.35
5 0.18 0.35
6 0.17 0.35
7 0.16 0.37
8 0.16 0.36
9 0.14 0.35
10 0.13 0.35
11 0.13 0.32
12 0.12 0.32
13 0.12 0.33
14 0.12 0.30
15 0.11 0.30
16 0.11 0.31
17 0.11 0.37
18 0.11 0.40
Source: Authors calculations
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Table 12: Linear probability model of match failure
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Importer age -0.005a -0.012a
Log # of exporters per importer-source country -0.001a 0.008a -0.010a
Exporter age -0.001a 0.000 0.0002c
Log # of importers per exporter -0.026a -0.046a -0.047a -0.024a
Length of match -0.023a -0.016a -0.018a 0.051a
Multi-product match dummy -0.094a -0.101a -0.101a -0.035a
Log match value -0.048a -0.049a -0.049a -0.037a
Log GDP per cap source country 0.001 0.004a 0.006a 0.141a
Log population source country 0.008a 0.004a 0.006a 0.419a
Log distance to source country -0.042a -0.021a -0.023a
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes
Importer FE No Yes No No
Importer-year FE No No Yes No
Match FE No No No Yes
N 2,183,257 2,183,257 2,183,257 2,183,257
R2 0.19 0.26 0.29 0.42
Source: Authors calculations. aand c indicates significance at the 1 and 10 percent
level respectively.
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Table 13: Product summary statistics, 2014
All US China Mexico Brazil
Mean products per importer 14.73 11.31 8.18 5.85 6.32
Median products per importer 4.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00
Mean products per exporter 6.30 7.17 5.16 5.68 5.89
Median products per exporter 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Mean no of products per importer-exporter 4.43 4.61 3.71 3.78 3.71
Median no of products per importer-exporter 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Share of importer-products > 1 supplier 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.05 0.07
Share of importer-products > 1 source country 0.09
Source: Authors calculations
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Table 14: Product replacements
Replacements Same country
1995 0.03 0.69
1996 0.04 0.77
1997 0.03 0.77
1998 0.02 0.77
1999 0.03 0.77
2000 0.03 0.78
2001 0.02 0.78
2002 0.03 0.76
2003 0.03 0.74
2004 0.03 0.72
2005 0.02 0.67
2006 0.02 0.68
2007 0.03 0.67
2008 0.02 0.65
2009 0.03 0.67
2010 0.03 0.66
2011 0.03 0.65
2012 0.03 0.65
2013 0.03 0.61
Source: Authors calculations
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Table 15: Relative evolution of imported products and foreign partners
(1)
VARIABLES #products/#suppliers
Age of importer 0.03a
(0.00)
Importer FE Yes
Year FE Yes
N 393,888
R2 0.60
Source: Authors calculations. a indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
36
Firm-to-Firm Connections in Colombian Imports
Table 16: Products per connection and share of total imported products - 1997 match cohort
# of Products Share of Total
Years (mean) (median) (mean) (median)
1 10.95 3.00 0.33 0.18
2 29.51 9.00 0.39 0.30
3 28.48 10.00 0.39 0.30
4 35.31 13.00 0.40 0.30
5 40.75 16.00 0.41 0.35
6 46.18 18.00 0.43 0.36
7 52.89 20.00 0.45 0.43
8 62.10 27.00 0.46 0.43
9 79.22 31.00 0.47 0.46
10 82.31 35.00 0.48 0.41
11 82.50 40.00 0.46 0.43
12 89.37 35.00 0.48 0.44
13 65.83 40.00 0.46 0.39
14 76.41 35.00 0.46 0.43
15 83.75 42.00 0.46 0.45
16 99.91 46.00 0.49 0.50
17 131.09 52.00 0.53 0.63
18 125.27 53.00 0.53 0.47
Source: Authors calculations
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Figure 1: Colombian Importers, Foreign Exporters, Total Import Value
Source: Authors calculations
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Figure 2: Foreign Exporters per Colombian Importer, Imported Products, and Source Countries
Source: Authors calculations
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Figure 3: Suppliers per Importer and Importers per Supplier - All Countries, 2014
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Figure 4: Importers per Supplier - Top Source Countries, 2014
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Figure 5: Log imports and the number of suppliers
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Figure 6: Log imports of 80th, 50th (median), and 20th percentile suppliers and the number of
suppliers
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supplier importers equal 1. The horizontal axis is the the number of suppliers for
the firm. Source: Authors calculations
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Figure 7: Degree assortativity
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Figure 8: Importer-Exporter Match Length
Source: Authors calculations
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Figure 9: Importer-Exporter (Match) Exit Rates
Source: Authors calculations
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Figure 10: Importer Exit Rates - 1997 Cohort
Source: Authors calculations
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